

1 **An Ecological-Economic Model on the Effects of Interactions between**
2 **Escaped Farmed and Wild Salmon (*Salmo salar*)**

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15 **Running title:** Economics of genetic effects of escapees on wild salmon

16
17 **Abstract**

18 This paper explores the ecological and economic impacts of interactions between
19 escaped farmed and wild Atlantic salmon (*Salmo salar*, Salmonidae) over generations. An
20 age- and stage-structured bioeconomic model is developed. The biological part of the model
21 includes age-specific life history traits such as survival rates, fecundity, and spawning
22 successes for wild and escaped farmed salmon, as well as their hybrids, while the economic
23 part takes account of use and non-use values of fish stock. The model is simulated under three
24 scenarios using data from the Atlantic salmon fishery and salmon farming in Norway. The
25 social welfare are derived from harvest and wild salmon while the economic benefits of
26 fishing comprise both sea and river fisheries. The results reveal that the wild salmon stock is
27 gradually replaced by salmon with farmed origin, while the total social welfare and economic
28 benefit decline, although not at the same rate as the wild salmon stock.

29 **Keywords:** age- and stage-structured model, genetic interaction, escaped farmed salmon, wild
30 salmon, social welfare, economic benefit

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46 **Introduction**

47 Norway has around 450 rivers sustaining salmon and holds the world’s largest
48 spawning population for Atlantic salmon (*Salmo salar*, Salmonidae). Currently, about 40% of
49 the overall catch in the North Atlantic are from Norwegian coastal waters and rivers (NASCO
50 2009). Wild salmon populations have suffered a steady decline in abundance in the last three
51 decades. This decline is likely caused by a combination of factors associated with human
52 activities including overexploitation, habitat degradation, salmon aquaculture, as well as
53 changes in natural environment (e.g., Jonsson and Jonsson 2006; Hindar *et al.* 2006). Norway
54 is the world’s number one producer of farmed salmon with a total first hand value of almost
55 NOK 20 billion in 2009 (Statistics Norway 2010). Concurrently, salmon aquaculture has
56 developed rapidly from a few 1000 tons in 1980 to 1 million tons in 2010 (Statistics Norway
57 2010).

58 The rapid development of salmon aquaculture has raised concerns over ecological and
59 environmental impacts on wild salmon populations and fisheries, particularly genetic

60 interactions between escaped farmed and wild salmon and transmission of sea lice and other
61 disease agents between farmed and wild fish. Each year, farmed salmon escape in large
62 numbers from the net-pens, and enter rivers upon sexual maturation. Fiske *et al.* (2006)
63 indicated that there is a significant positive correlation between the number of farmed
64 escapees in rivers and the intensity of farmed salmon in the net-pens. It is estimated that
65 escaped farmed salmon comprise on average 14 - 36% of the total spawning populations in
66 Norwegian rivers, even up to 80% of the spawning populations in some rivers (Fiske *et al.*
67 2001; Hansen 2006). Escaped farmed salmon are able to leave offspring in the wild and
68 interbreed with wild salmon (Fleming *et al.* 2000).

69 Farmed salmon were originally derived from wild salmon populations and have been
70 artificially selected for economic traits such as growth rate, age at sexual maturity and
71 resistance to diseases since the 1970s (Gjøen and Bentsen 1997). They are reared in controlled
72 captive facilities with abundant food supply and few predation threats. Their genetic
73 variability and some biological and behavior characteristics of farmed salmon have altered
74 over time. Ultimately, farmed salmon are becoming increasingly genetically different from
75 their wild counterparts (Weir and Grant 2005; Karlsson *et al.* in press).

76 Interbreeding between escaped farmed and wild salmon causes genotypic and gene
77 expression changes in wild salmon populations (Roberge *et al.* 2008). It may also cause
78 depression in the fitness and productivity of wild salmon (Hindar *et al.* 2006; Jonsson and
79 Jonsson 2006). The cumulative reduction in fitness and productivity resulting from the
80 repeated intrusion of escapees may, therefore, lead to severe declines in the salmon
81 populations, and in a worst case scenario even wipe out the more vulnerable ones (Hurtchings
82 1991; McGinnity *et al.* 2003). Consequently, offspring from escaped farmed individuals may
83 eventually replace the wild salmon populations (Hindar *et al.* 2006). The consequences of

84 interbreeding can be exhibited in the changes in life history traits such as fecundity, breeding
85 success, timing of spawning, age and size at smoltification, and stage specific survival and
86 growth rates. Experiments in rivers and semi-natural stream channels (McGinnity *et al.* 2003;
87 2004; Fleming *et al.* 1996 & 2000) have shown that escaped farmed salmon and subsequent
88 offspring are competitively and reproductively inferior to wild salmon, resulting in lower
89 survival rates and reproductive success. A meta-analysis of existing global data also indicated
90 that there are reductions in both survival and abundance in Atlantic salmon populations in
91 association with increased production of farmed salmon (Ford and Myers 2008). In some
92 rivers, offspring of farmed salmon attain larger body size and higher fecundity than their wild
93 counterparts, but the increased egg production does not compensate for the reduced survival
94 of escaped farmed salmon with respect to fitness (McGinnity *et al.* 2003). Hindar *et al.* (2006)
95 developed a dynamic simulation model for Atlantic salmon which incorporated the changes in
96 the fitness-related and phenotypic traits during interbreeding over generations, and further
97 analyzed the genetic and ecological effects of escaped farmed salmon on wild salmon stocks
98 with different intrusion rates.

99 While the ecological effects of genetic interactions between farmed escapees and wild
100 salmon have been widely acknowledged, economic effects of such interactions have not been
101 studied. This paper examines the combined ecological and economic impacts of genetic
102 interactions between escaped farmed and wild salmon. Given different fishing mortalities, the
103 productivity of wild salmon and the economic values from fishing and wild salmon
104 population are analyzed by developing a dynamic bioeconomic simulation model. The
105 biological component of the model describes the salmon population dynamics using an age-
106 and stage-structured model that incorporates interactions between escaped farmed and wild
107 salmon through relative differences in age specific life-history traits such as maturation rates,

108 fecundity, spawning success, survival and growth rates. The economic component of the
109 model includes both use and non-use values by estimating the benefit of fishing and non-
110 market value of fish stock through a social welfare function.

111 The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the age- and stage-
112 structured biological model, while the economic model is presented in Section 3. The model
113 specification and data are described in Section 4 while Section 5 shows the results and
114 discussion. Conclusions with some policy implications are given in Section 6.

115

116 **The Age- and Stage-structured Population Dynamic Model**

117 Atlantic salmon is an anadromous species, meaning it lives in both marine and
118 freshwater environments and migrates upstream to spawn. Wild Norwegian salmon
119 populations spend on average 2 - 5 years in freshwater, from hatching until becoming smolts
120 and migrating towards the sea. The salmon feed and grow at sea for 1 - 3 years, before
121 returning to their natal rivers when reaching maturity. Mature salmon (spawners) migrate to
122 the rivers during the summer and autumn, and spawn in late autumn. The fertilized eggs spend
123 the winter in the gravel before hatching in the following spring. Thus, the Atlantic salmon
124 have a relative complex life history with several distinct stages.

125 Escaped farmed salmon may enter the fjords and rivers at different life stages. Our
126 analysis gives special emphasis on those that escape at the post-smolt stage, considered as
127 early escapees (hereafter called FE for Farm Early escapees), and those that escape at the
128 adult stage (FL for Farm Late escapees). Some of these escapees enter the rivers and
129 participate in the spawning.

130 Each river and stock has its own population dynamics with different life histories
131 (Hutchings and Jones 1998). Here we parameterize an age- and stage-structured model for an

132 example river similar to River Imsa which is located in the southern part of Norway and has
133 been subject to several studies (see Section 4), although with larger rearing environment and
134 twice the recruitment. Simulations resulting from this model illustrate the effect of genetic
135 interactions between farmed escapees and wild salmon, with an emphasis on the early life
136 stages crucial for population regulation. The biological model framework is a modified form
137 of the dynamic population model developed by Hindar *et al.* (2006), explicitly including a
138 density-dependent stock-recruitment model. We assume that the Atlantic salmon life cycle is
139 divided into five stages; from spawned eggs to hatching, to fry (recruitment), smolt, marine
140 growth and finally returning to the next spawning. The wild salmon population is defined by
141 the number of salmon at each age and stage. The dynamic age-stage-structured population
142 models are captured in the equations below, while Figure 1 presents a schematic overview of
143 a single cohort salmon population with inclusion of escaped farmed salmon.

144 *Insert Figure 1 here*

145 The spawning population will, for our example river, be made up of two age classes
146 with different size distributions; salmon that have been one winter at sea (1SW, also called
147 grilse) and those that have been two winters at sea (2SW). Some salmon populations also
148 have a small number of older spawners but we choose to ignore these in our simulations.
149 Another simplification is that we do not include repeated spawners, although as many as 10 %
150 of female spawners may spawn twice (Mills 1989). When modelling the spawning, we assign
151 the spawners to five categories (Hindar *et al.* 2006): wild (W), hybrid offspring with wild and
152 escaped farmed salmon as parents (H), offspring from escaped farmed salmon (F), and then
153 the spawners that themselves have escaped as post-smolts (FE) or as adults (FL). We will in
154 this simulation assume that all age classes and categories have an equal sex distribution. In

155 addition, some of the male parr also mature in freshwater and participate in the spawning;
156 wild parr (WP), hybrid parr (HP) and feralized farm offspring parr (FP).

157 According to sex and category, each spawner is assigned a spawning success rate (Table
158 1; Hindar *et al.* 2006) where the spawners that have spent their life roaming freely (W, H and
159 F) have the best success and the late escapees (FL) are the least successful, i.e. they are the
160 least fit for the competition on the spawning grounds. By introducing average weights for the
161 females of each age and category, and applying a general fecundity weight relationship
162 (Hindar *et al.* 2011), we are able to generate the size and composition of the fertilized egg
163 pool. The eggs are then assigned to one of six categories; just wild parents (W), hybrids with
164 one wild and one farmed parent (H), just farmed parents (F), back-cross of hybrid to wild, i.e.
165 with one hybrid and one wild parent (BCW), back-cross to farm (BCF), and finally second or
166 later generation hybrids (2GH).

167 After hatching and swim-up the following spring, the recruitment to the fry stage in
168 their first autumn (“0+”) is described by a Shepherd Stock-Recruitment (SR) model
169 (Shepherd 1982). Our modified Shepherd SR-function is defined as:

170 (1)
$$R_{i,t} = \frac{a_i S_{i,t}}{1 + (b S_{tot,t})^\beta},$$

171 where $S_{i,t}$ is the spawning stock, measured as the number of fertilized eggs, of category i
172 spawned in year t , $S_{tot,t}$ is the total spawning stock over all categories, and $R_{i,t}$ is the fry
173 recruitment of category i from the same cohort. The parameter a_i is the gradient of the
174 function when the stock $S_{i,t}$ approaches zero and represents the density independent survival
175 from fertilized egg to fry for category i , b is the strength of the density-dependent regulation

176 assumed equal for all categories, and the parameter β gives the curvature of the density
177 dependence.

178 Further, we assume that all fish smoltify as 2 year old juveniles with a category
179 specific survival rate $s_{1,i}$ from fry to smolt (see Table 1), so the number of smolt of category i
180 from spawning cohort t becomes simply

181 (2)
$$Sm_{i,t} = s_{1,i}R_{i,t}.$$

182 For the marine phase we just have available data on survival and maturation for the W,
183 H and F categories, so to reduce the number of categories half of the back-crosses of hybrids
184 to wild fish (BCW) are allocated to the W category and the other half to the H category.
185 Similarly, half of the back-cross to farm category (BCF) is allocated to the F and the other
186 half to the H category. The second generation hybrids are allocated entirely to the H category.
187 As a result, the H category eventually consists of a diverse set of first and later generation
188 hybrids, as well as half of the various backcrosses to wild and farmed fish. Furthermore, the
189 W and F categories include proportions of the backcrosses, in addition to the fish of entirely
190 wild and farmed pedigrees respectively.

191 From a cohort t , the number of returning 1SW spawners of a given category $N1_{i,t}$
192 depends on the survival rate the first year at sea $s_{1s,i}$ and the corresponding maturation rate μ
193 for 1SW, giving the equation

194 (3)
$$N1_{i,t} = Sm_{i,t}s_{1s,i}\mu.$$

195 By assuming all remaining salmon mature as 2SW, Equation (4) describes the number
196 of returning 2SW spawners for a category i from the survival rate the second year at sea $s_{2s,i}$:

197 (4)
$$N2_{i,t} = Sm_{i,t}s_{1s,i}(1-\mu)s_{2s,i}.$$

198 Finally, the returning mature 1SW and 2SW salmon experience harvesting both along
199 the coast and in the rivers during their migration back to their native spawning grounds. The
200 number of returning 1SW and 2SW surviving the combined sea and river fishing to spawn in
201 a given year $t+4$ then becomes

$$202 \quad (5) \quad X1_{i,t+4} = N1_{i,t} (1 - f_{1,t+4}) \text{ and}$$

$$203 \quad (6) \quad X2_{i,t+4} = N2_{i,t-1} (1 - f_{2,t+4}),$$

204 where $f_{1,t}$ and $f_{2,t}$ is the fishing mortality for 1SW and 2SW respectively, which may vary
205 between years. However, in the next section, on the economic benefit modelling, we use
206 $X_t = X1_t + X2_t$ for the total spawning stock.

207

208 **The Economic Benefits**

209 Returning salmon are first harvested by commercial, or semi commercial, fishermen in
210 the fjords and inlets along the coast. The surviving individuals are then targeted by
211 recreational anglers in the rivers. The commercial catch is destined for meat value, whereas
212 recreational fishing is for sport and leisure, and possibly also personal consumption. Thus, the
213 economic benefits to be measured here are based on sequential salmon harvests from sea and
214 river. Besides fishing, or direct use values, wild salmon also has non-use values such as an
215 intrinsic value (existence value), simply because of its existence in the environment. A special
216 emphasis is therefore given to incorporate such non-use values (see e.g. Freeman 2003 for a
217 general overview). Due to the above two-sided values derived from salmon, two different
218 ways to measure these values are analysed in this paper. First, we consider the use value
219 where the fishing monetary value of the salmon population is only taken into account. We
220 next consider the conservation and use perspective where both the harvest and stock are

221 included, and where the utility, or welfare, of the salmon is described in number of fish
 222 harvested and the size of the wild standing stock.

223 The economic benefit based on the direct use value only is measured by the market
 224 value of the total harvest. The benefit includes two parts: commercial fishing in the sea and
 225 recreational fishing in the river. The benefit from sea fishing is measured by meat value at
 226 market prices. Leaving the recently escaped farmed salmon out, it is assumed that the sea
 227 fishermen consider *fish is just a fish*, the prices thus only differ in fish size and associated
 228 weights, and are unaffected by salmon categories. On the contrary, the benefit from
 229 recreational fishing is generated through selling fishing permits which is measured by the
 230 anglers' willingness-to-pay (WTP) on the basis of the quality and quantity of wild salmon
 231 stock (Olaussen and Skonhøft 2008). An important quality factor taken into account here is
 232 the composition of the salmon stock; that is, the mix between wild and farmed salmon.
 233 Olaussen and Liu (2010) indicate that salmon anglers are willing to pay substantially more for
 234 the pure wild or 'clean' salmon stock. Therefore, the WTP is measured in response to the
 235 changes in the composition of wild salmon in the total spawning population of all three
 236 categories (more details below). Thus, the economic benefit over the evaluation period,
 237 comprising T years, is written as:

238 (7)
$$\Pi = \sum_{t=1}^T \rho^t \pi_t = \sum_{t=1}^T \rho^t \left[\sum_{j=1}^2 (p^{s,j} Y_t^{s,j}) + p_t^r Y_t^r \right],$$

239 where $\rho^t = 1 / (1 + \omega)^t$ is the discount factor with a discount rate $\omega \geq 0$.

240 The first term in the square brackets on the right hand of this equation, $p^{s,j} Y_t^{s,j}$,
 241 describes the profits from sea fishing while the second term, $p_t^r Y_t^r$, represents the benefit
 242 from river fishing. The parameters $p^{s,j}$ are the net market prices for salmon harvested which
 243 include 1SW ($j=1$) and 2SW ($j=2$) salmon, assumed to be independent of harvest

244 intensity, time, and categories, but related to age classes, and $Y_t^{s,j}$ are the catches of all three
245 categories of salmon from 1SW and 2SW measured in wet weight (in kg), only separated by
246 age classes. p_t^r is the price of salmon caught in the river (in NOK per kg) transformed from
247 the fishing license fee that anglers are willing to pay. The price of a fishing license is
248 determined by the composition of the wild salmon in the total returned spawning population
249 (more details are provided in Section 4). For this reason, p_t^r generally changes over time.
250 Finally, Y_t^r is the total harvest from river fishing in wet weight (in kg).

251 We next consider the conservation and use perspective of salmon by formulating a
252 utility, or welfare, function. As indicated, it includes two components: the utility provided
253 through harvesting salmon (use value) and the utility derived from the intrinsic value (non-use
254 value) the wild salmon stock possesses. When assuming separability, the social welfare at
255 time t is thus written as $W_t = \alpha[U(Y_t)] + (1 - \alpha)[V(X_t^w)]$, where $U(Y_t)$ represents the utility
256 from the harvested salmon while $V(X_t^w)$ is the utility from the wild spawning salmon stock,
257 that is, the intrinsic value of the wild salmon stock.

258 Both $U(Y_t)$ and $V(X_t^w)$ are assumed to be increasing and concave functions, i.e., it is
259 assumed that a higher salmon stock as well as a higher harvest yields a higher utility, but at a
260 declining rate. $0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$ is a parameter weighting for the utility level of harvesting (see, e.g.,
261 Kurz 1968 for a similar treatment within a neoclassical economic growth framework). If
262 $\alpha = 0$ it hence implies that only the size of the wild stock is taken into account; and if $\alpha = 1$ it
263 means that only the harvesting counts while $\alpha = 0.5$ implies an equal valuation of the harvest
264 and stock abundance. Y_t is the harvest including 2 classes: 1SW and 2SW, and three categories
265 of salmon: wild (W), hybrid (H) and feral (F) from sea and river fishing. The stock, X_t^w , only

266 refers to wild salmon where the two spawning classes, 1SW and 2SW in the sea and river are
 267 included. All the harvests and wild stock are measured by their respective average body
 268 weights in kg, which differ between age classes and salmon categories. The present value of
 269 welfare is hence described by:

$$270 \quad (8) \quad W = \sum_{t=1}^T \rho^t W_t = \sum_{t=1}^T \rho^t \{ \alpha [U(Y_t)] + (1 - \alpha) [V(X_t)] \},$$

271 where $\rho^t = 1 / (1 + \delta)^t$ is the utility discount factor with $\delta \geq 0$ as the discount rate.

272

273 **Model Specification and Data**

274 Based on the bioeconomic model developed above (Sections 2 and 3), we use an
 275 example river where the fitness parameters (Table 1) are similar to those obtained from the
 276 experiments in River Imsa in Norway (Fleming *et al.* 2000) and Burrishoole river system in
 277 Ireland (McGinnity *et al.* 2003) to illustrate the potential ecological and economic effects of
 278 interbreeding between farmed and wild salmon (following Hinder *et al.* 2006).

279 We specify the welfare function defined in Eq. (8) by letting both $U(Y_t)$ and
 280 $V(X_t^w)$ have a logarithmic form: $W_t = \alpha \log(Y_t) + (1 - \alpha) \log(X_t^w)$. The one-day fishing license
 281 price is defined based on the salmon anglers' WTP study by Olaussen and Liu (2010). The
 282 survey was conducted among salmon anglers nationwide in 2005 and 2006 (Olaussen 2005;
 283 Olaussen and Liu 2010). The main findings from the survey were that for a one-day fishing
 284 license the salmon anglers are willing to pay NOK 242 if their catch was made of pure wild
 285 salmon, NOK 94 if the catch was half wild and half farmed salmon, while they only want to
 286 pay NOK 34 if the catch was completely made up of farmed salmon, *ceteris paribus*. Here we
 287 consider both escapees and their offspring as farmed, although most anglers will have
 288 problems differentiate between wild salmon and offspring from escapees. Based on these

289 findings, a simple polynomial regression model is fitted. Let p_t^{r0} represent the price per one-
290 day fishing license (NOK per day), then we have: $p_t^{r0} = 176k_t^2 + 32k_t + 34$, where $0 \leq k \leq 1$ is
291 the proportion of wild salmon in the total spawning population at t . If \bar{w}_r is the averaged
292 weight of salmon caught in rivers per day or per fishing license period (in kg/day), then the
293 price of salmon caught in rivers writes: $p_t^r = p_t^{r0} / \bar{w}_r$ (in NOK per kg).

294 The model is run for a period of 40 years, $T = 40$, that is, about 10 salmon
295 generations for the modelled salmon populations. To get realistic initial numbers for 1SW and
296 2SW spawners, we first run the age structured model for 100 years, based on the parameters
297 of other life-history traits such as fecundity, spawning success rate, and age specific survival
298 rates, but without any fishing mortality or escapees. After this burn-in period, the wild salmon
299 population will arrive at an equilibrium state where the size of the population remains at a
300 constant level. We then use these equilibrium values for 1SW and 2SW wild salmon spawners
301 as initial values at year 1 (see horizontal blue lines, marked as “Unfished”, in Figures 2.
302 Provided that the salmon population is also affected by other factors, such as habitat
303 characteristics and climate factors, using unfished (virgin) stock size may solely concentrate
304 on the escape problem, *ceteris paribus*.

305 A large number of parameter values is required to run the simulation model (Table 1).
306 Some are extracted from the other studies, some are estimated based on the collected field
307 data and some are calibrated from general fishing practice in Norway. These parameter values
308 with references are reported in Table 1. The most important variable for our paper is the
309 number of escapees in the spawning population in a river. The number of farmed salmon
310 escapees from net-pens depends on farmed production and onsite management (Fiske *et al.*
311 2006) whereas the proportions farmed escapees which make up in the spawning populations

312 also depend on the size of the wild stock. The monitoring program for Norwegian wild
313 salmon revealed that on average 20% of the spawning population is of farm origin, although
314 the number of escaped salmon varies from year to year (Fiske *et al.* 2001; Hansen 2006;
315 Hindar *et al.* 2006). Additionally, as we use the equilibrium (unfished) population at year 1, a
316 fixed number of escapees which is 20% of the equilibrium spawning population at year 1 will
317 enter the spawning population annually. Therefore, in order to have a comprehensive
318 understanding how farmed escapees affect wild salmon populations and fisheries, the
319 simulation model is run under three scenarios for farmed escapees: Scenario I) without
320 escapees; Scenario II) escapees constitute 20% of the annual spawning population from year
321 1; Scenario III) with a constant number (50) of escapees entering the river each year from
322 year 1. Moreover, we also use discount rates equal to zero when estimating economic benefits
323 and welfare, i.e., in our simulations we set $\delta = 0$ and $\omega = 0$. This is because wild salmon
324 population should be managed in a sustainable manner, indicating that future generations
325 should have the same possibility to experience wild salmon as the present generation (NOU
326 1999). Three values for weighting the utility value of harvesting α are used: 0, 0.5, and 1 in
327 the welfare function (Eq. 8). Fishing mortalities ranging from 0 to 0.9 are applied in the
328 simulations.

329 The fishing mortality rates for different fishing environments and age classes have to be
330 specified before running simulations. In the sea fishing there is a size bias in the harvest so
331 that it is more likely to catch a large salmon than a smaller one (Strand and Heggberget 1996),
332 whereas in the river fishing the size bias is reversed; now it is less likely to catch the larger
333 salmon. Strand and Heggberget (1996) only investigated the size bias for wild salmon but we
334 assume this effect applies for all three categories of salmon, i.e. wild, hybrid and feral. First,
335 we assume that the combined sea and river fishing mortality rates for both age classes are

336 approximately equal. The annual combined fishing mortality will change slightly through the
337 simulation period of 40 years due to changes in the age distribution, caused by the increase in
338 farm offspring spawners. The different levels of fishing mortality rates applied in the
339 simulations will be referred to by the rate for a population with equally many spawners of
340 both age classes. The same fishing mortality rate is then applied annually for the 40 simulated
341 years. Thus, the fishing mortalities presented in tables and figures in next section are the
342 averaged numbers over 40 years. The simulations are conducted using the statistical software
343 R (R Development, Core Team 2009).

344 *Insert Table 1 here*

345

346 **Results and Discussions**

347 ***Scenario I - Without escapees***

348 This scenario with no escaped farmed salmon entering the river is illustrated in Figure 2
349 and will be used as a benchmark for the other scenarios (Scenarios II and III). Therefore,
350 fishing is assumed to be the only manmade factor affecting the salmon population in this
351 scenario. Given a fishing mortality larger than 0, the spawning population will gradually
352 decline, and reach an equilibrium state or steady state after some years (Figure 2). An
353 increased fishing mortality rate will result in a faster decline in salmon population. The
354 maximum harvest (in kg) over 40 years is achieved at a fishing mortality of 0.8, where the
355 fish stock reaches a stable state after about 10-12 years (top panel in Table 2). These results
356 are similar to those found in Hindar *et al.* (2011) and depend on the strength of natural
357 mortality.

358 *Insert Figure 2 and Table 2 here*

359 The direct economic benefits from sea and river fishing, Π , as described by Eq. (7) are
360 reported in Table 3 (upper part). The highest economic benefit is obtained with a fishing
361 mortality of 0.7 for river fishing, and 0.8 for sea fishing. This difference in fishing mortality is
362 observed because sea fishing harvests a higher proportion of 2SW than 1SW fish while river
363 fishing catches proportionally more 1SW fish, and because 2SW fish is twice heavier than
364 1SW fish. The overall economic benefit is highest at the fishing mortality of 0.7, as river
365 fishing yields substantially higher benefit than sea fishing because the anglers' willingness-to-
366 pay for a fishing license in rivers is much higher than the meat values received from sea
367 fishing (see also Section 3). The social welfare, W , described by Eq. (8) varies with different
368 fishing mortalities and weights for the utility level of harvesting α (top panel in Table 4). The
369 highest welfare ($W = 112.52$) is achieved when there is no fishing ($f = 0$) and only stock size
370 counts ($\alpha = 0$).

371 *Insert Table 3 and 4 here*

372

373 ***Scenario II - Escapees constitute 20% of the total annual spawning population***

374 Figures 3, 4 and 5 present the spawning population, total harvest and economic benefits
375 respectively when the escapees constitute 20% of annual spawning population. For all fishing
376 mortalities, the biomass of wild salmon declines (downward curves, Figure 3) while the
377 biomass of farmed salmon increases (upward curves, Figure 3), although the magnitude of
378 those changes increase with higher fishing mortality. In the case of no fishing, the spawning
379 population has lost roughly 54% of its wild biomass, but has gained 40% of salmon of farmed
380 origin from year 1 to year 40 after about 10 generations. The total biomass of spawning
381 population is reduced by 7% due to effects of interbreeding because hybrid and feral salmon
382 have lower lifetime fitness, but are heavier than wild salmon. However, in terms of numbers,

383 the reduction in the wild spawners and total spawning population is more severe, respectively
384 representing 77% and 26% of losses, and the salmon of farmed origin has become dominant
385 genotype of the spawning population.

386 The decline in stock size will naturally become steeper when fishing takes place. For
387 example, with an annual total fishing mortality of 0.70, the wild spawning stock is reduced by
388 84%, while the total spawning stock loses 73% over 40 years. The salmon that are partially or
389 fully of farmed origin constitute 75% of the total spawning stock at year 40. Likewise, the
390 wild salmon stock loses almost 94% of its original size with a fishing mortality of 0.9. This
391 may suggest that the wild salmon stock is at the edge of collapse, if not collapsed yet,
392 biologically. These findings are similar to those found in Hindar *et al.* (2006).

393 *Insert Figure 3 here*

394 The total harvest from both sea and river fishing declines for the first 8 years (two
395 generations), especially so for the simulations with the higher fishing mortalities. After this
396 initial period, the harvest remains relatively stable except for the fishing mortality of 0.9
397 where the harvest continues to decrease for the whole simulation period. However, the higher
398 fishing mortality yields greater harvest at the first generation, but the total harvest is the
399 highest for fishing mortalities 0.8 (Figure 4, and middle panel in Table 2). The economic
400 benefit of sea and river fishing follows the same trends as the harvest. Compared to Scenario I
401 without escapees, the economic benefits from sea fishing have dropped slightly, whereas the
402 economic benefits from river fishing has been reduced considerably given the same fishing
403 mortality. The reason for this difference between sea and river economic benefits is, as
404 already indicated, that sea fishermen consider *a fish as a fish* no matter if it is wild or farmed.
405 Therefore, the drop in the number of wild fish is compensated by the weight gained from the
406 larger hybrid and feral fish. On the other hand, anglers are willing to pay substantially more

407 for fishing wild salmon. However, the economic benefit of river fishing is still much larger
408 than that of sea fishing. The economic benefit over the simulation period is first improved
409 when the fishing mortality is increased, then reaches its maximum at a fishing mortality of
410 0.8, and is then reduced again for a fishing mortality of 0.9 (Figure 5; middle panel in Table
411 3). The maximum social welfare value of 100.42 is obtained for a fishing mortality of 0.7 and
412 a weight for the utility level of harvesting $\alpha = 1$. This maximum social welfare value is lower
413 than that found for Scenario I, i.e. with no escapees where the maximum social welfare value
414 of 112.52 is achieved for no fishing and $\alpha = 0$. Moreover, for given any fishing mortalities
415 and values of α , the social welfare is always lower under Scenario II than in Scenario I with
416 no escapees (middle panel in Table 4).

417 *Insert Figures 4 and 5 here*

418 ***Scenario III - With escapees – 50 escapees each year***

419 The third scenario assumes that a fixed number of escapees (50) enter the spawning
420 stock each year. When the fishing mortality is increased, leading to a decrease in the number
421 of remaining spawners, a fixed number of annual escapees will account for an increasing
422 proportion of the total spawning population. The change in the composition of spawning
423 population will thereby be more dramatic than in Scenario II. For instance, with a fishing
424 mortality of 0.5 or higher the last wild salmon will have disappeared before 40 years,
425 suggesting that salmon of full or partial farm origin have completely replaced the wild stock
426 (Figure 6). In contrast, the total harvest increases with higher fishing mortality due to the high
427 annual addition of escapees. Thus, the maximum annual harvest is obtained for a fishing
428 mortality of 0.9 (Figure 7). The consequences for the economic benefit of increasing the
429 fishing mortality under Scenario III are, however, not unambiguous. The economic benefit
430 from sea fishing keeps rising with increasing fishing mortality, while the economic benefit

431 from river fishing reaches its highest value over the 40 year period for a fishing mortality of
432 0.6 (bottom panel in Table 3 and Figure 8). After 40 years, the wild salmon stock has
433 vanished for all fishing mortalities higher than 0.25. The total economic benefit is improved
434 with a progressively higher fishing mortality. The economic benefit of sea fishing for fishing
435 mortalities of 0.5 or more is the highest among the three scenarios (bottom panel in Table 3),
436 because we under Scenario III annually add most new escapees to the population among three
437 scenarios. A fixed number of 50 escapees account for 20% of the total spawning stock in the
438 first years, then gradually becomes a larger proportion to the total spawning stock as the
439 number of returning spawners is declining. Finally, the spawning population will consist of
440 salmon of farmed origin only. In other words, the exploitable population is becoming bigger
441 through time. Similarly, the highest social welfare value is obtained for a fishing mortality of
442 0.9. These results indicate that a high proportion of escapees will enhance the total harvesting
443 population for the higher fishing mortalities, and consequently yield higher catch levels and
444 economic benefits if offspring from farmed salmon are perceived as and valued as wild
445 salmon like the case of sea fishing.

446 *Insert Figures 6 and 7 here*

447 For any given fishing mortality and α value, the social welfare will be lower when
448 there are escapees in the spawning population, compared to Scenario I without any escaped
449 farmed salmon. The larger the proportion of escapees in the spawning population is, the
450 smaller will the social welfare value become (Table 4). However, the difference in social
451 welfare between the scenarios is decreasing for increasing values of α , because we go from
452 $\alpha = 0$, where only the size of the wild stock is valued, then to $\alpha = 0.5$ where the harvest and
453 stock values are equally weighted, finally to $\alpha = 1$, where only the harvest matters. Although

454 α is an exogenous variable in welfare analysis (Eq. 8), these results, however, suggest that
455 when conservation of wild salmon population is the dominant management strategy, lower
456 fishing mortality rates are required. When the socioeconomic benefit for society is the main
457 concern, higher fishing mortality will be necessary. If conservation and socioeconomic
458 objectives are equally weighted, an intermediate fishing mortality (~ 0.5) will be the most
459 favourable.

460 Finally, both the sea harvest and the economic benefit of sea fishing are reduced with
461 decreasing proportions of escapees in the spawning stock. The economic benefit of river
462 fishing will, on the other hand, increase when the proportion of escapees is reduced due to the
463 assumption that fishermen and anglers value offspring from farmed salmon differently.

464 *Insert Figure 8 here*

465 **Conclusions**

466 This paper has developed a bioeconomic model that describes the impacts of genetic
467 interactions between wild and escaped farmed salmon. The ecological and economic effects
468 of farmed escapees on wild salmon populations and fisheries are illustrated by simulations
469 from the model, based on fitness parameter estimates similar to those from River Imsa in
470 Norway. Simulations from three scenarios, without or with escapees, are conducted with a
471 range of fishing mortalities. This study is, to our knowledge, the first numerical analysis
472 carried out in the level of population dynamics to investigate the economic impacts of genetic
473 interaction between escapees and native species, or genetic ‘pollution’ from farmed escapees
474 to native species. The model has explicitly included stage specific life-history traits, and use
475 and non-use values of salmon stock. Guttormsen *et al.* (2008, see also some references
476 mentioned in the paper) described a theoretical framework of optimal harvest of genetically
477 different populations.

478 The results indicate that the composition of the spawning population will change
479 dramatically when escaped farmed salmon are participating in the spawning over a 40 year
480 period, i.e. about 10 salmon generations. The number of wild salmon declines while the
481 number of farmed offspring will increase. The trends get stronger with higher escape rates and
482 eventually the salmon with farmed origin will dominate the spawning population, and even
483 replace the wild stock completely, if the invasion of escapees is large enough. This was the
484 case for Scenario III, where the number of new escapees was the same each year, regardless
485 of how large the wild or feralized spawning population was.

486 The economic benefits were also affected by the genetic interactions between wild and
487 farm offspring. For a given fishing mortality, the total economic benefit will decrease with
488 increasing proportions of escaped farmed salmon in the spawning population. If the economic
489 benefit is split between sea and river fishing, we see the same trend for the economic benefit
490 of river fishing, i.e. it is decreasing when the proportion of farmed offspring in the population
491 is increasing. For sea fishing we see the opposite result; for a fishing mortality above 0.5 the
492 economic benefit will grow when the proportion of escapees increase because the harvestable
493 population will also increase and the market price is the same for wild salmon and farmed
494 offspring. However, if the offspring from escaped farmed salmon is perceived to have a lower
495 market value than wild ones, the economic value for the sea fishing may also decrease with
496 increasing proportion of escapees, although the total harvest may become larger. Moreover, if
497 the wild stock value (such as intrinsic value) is taken into account, further losses will be
498 observed when the proportion of escapees increases. In a long term perspective, conserving
499 the wild salmon stock by reducing the number of escapees and only allowing a modest fishing
500 mortality will give a higher benefit for society. However, it becomes clear that the genetic

501 effects of farmed escapees on wild salmon stock are severe, even devastating whereas the
502 economic consequences are ambiguous.

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510

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595

596 **Table 1.** The parameter values for the bioeconomic model.

597

Parameters	Values	Source
<i>Fecundity ratio (eggs/kg)</i>	1450	Hindar <i>et al.</i> 2011
<i>Female spawning success rate</i>		
Wild	0.90	Hindar <i>et al.</i> 2006
Hybrid	0.90	Hindar <i>et al.</i> 2006
Feral	0.90	Hindar <i>et al.</i> 2006
Farmed_early	0.82	Hindar <i>et al.</i> 2006; Fleming <i>et al.</i> 1997
Farmed_late	0.40	Hindar <i>et al.</i> 2006; Fleming <i>et al.</i> 1996 &2000;
<i>Adult male relatively spawning success rate</i>		
Wild	1.00	Hindar <i>et al.</i> 2006
Hybrid	1.00	Hindar <i>et al.</i> 2006
Feral	1.00	Hindar <i>et al.</i> 2006
Farmed_early	0.51	Hindar <i>et al.</i> 2006
Farmed_late	0.13	Fleming <i>et al.</i> 1996 &2000;
<i>Male parr maturity rate at age 0+</i>		
Wild	0.18	Fleming <i>et al.</i> 2000
Hybrid	0.13	Fleming <i>et al.</i> 2000
Feral	0.14	Fleming <i>et al.</i> 2000
<i>Male parr relative spawning success rate</i>		
Wild	1.00	Garant <i>et al.</i> 2003; Weir <i>et al.</i> 2005;
Hybrid	2.,33	Garant <i>et al.</i> 2003; Weir <i>et al.</i> 2005;
Feral	1.89	Garant <i>et al.</i> 2003; Weir <i>et al.</i> 2005;
<i>Proportion of eggs sired by male parr</i>	0.235	Garant <i>et al.</i> 2003; Weir <i>et al.</i> 2005;
<i>Stock-Recruitment model parameters</i>		
a	0.171	Estimated from Imsa river
b (#/m2)	0.271	Estimated from Imsa river
Beta	0.961	Estimated from Imsa river
Area (m2)	94100	Estimated from Imsa river
<i>Maximum density independent survival rate of from swim-up to 0+</i>		
Wild	0.17	Estimated from Imsa river; McGinnity 1997;
Hybrid	0.11	Estimated from Imsa river; McGinnity <i>et al.</i> 2003; Estimated from Imsa river; McGinnity 1997;
Feral	0.15	McGinnity <i>et al.</i> 2003; Estimated from Imsa river; McGinnity 1997;
BCW	0.14	McGinnity <i>et al.</i> 2003; Estimated from Imsa river; McGinnity 1997;
BCF	0.12	McGinnity <i>et al.</i> 2003; Estimated from Imsa river; McGinnity 1997;
2GH	0.13	McGinnity <i>et al.</i> 2003;

<i>Survival rate from age 0+ to 2+ old smolt</i>		
Wild	0.25	Fleming <i>et al.</i> 2000; McGinnity 2003; Hindar <i>et al.</i> 2006;
Hybrid	0.23	Fleming <i>et al.</i> 2000; McGinnity 2003; Hindar <i>et al.</i> 2006;
Feral	0.27	Fleming <i>et al.</i> 2000; McGinnity 2003; Hindar <i>et al.</i> 2006;
BCW	0.28	Fleming <i>et al.</i> 2000; McGinnity 2003; Hindar <i>et al.</i> 2006;
BCF	0.28	Fleming <i>et al.</i> 2000; McGinnity 2003; Hindar <i>et al.</i> 2006;
F2	0.33	Fleming <i>et al.</i> 2000; McGinnity 2003; Hindar <i>et al.</i> 2006;
<i>Survival rate from smolt to 1SW</i>		
Wild	0.10	Hindar <i>et al.</i> 2006; Estimated from Imsa river
Hybrid	0.09	Hindar <i>et al.</i> 2006; Estimated from Imsa river
Feral	0.06	Hindar <i>et al.</i> 2006; Estimated from Imsa river
<i>Survival rate from 1SW to 2SW</i>		
Wild	0.50	Calibrated
Hybrid	0.50	Calibrated
Feral	0.50	Calibrated
<i>Maturity rate in 1SW</i>		
Wild	0.67	Calibrated
Hybrid	0.57	Calibrated
Feral	0.00	Calibrated
<i>Fishing</i>		
Averaged weight of salmon caught per day in rivers (kg/day)	0.50	Statistics Norway
<i>Weight</i>		
1SW wild (kg)	2.00	Calibrated
1SW hybrid (kg)	2.40	Calibrated
1SW Farmed (kg)	2.80	Calibrated
2SW wild (kg)	5.00	Calibrated
2SW hybrid (kg)	6.00	Calibrated
2SW farmed (kg)	7.00	Calibrated
<i>Salmon prices</i>		
1SW in the sea (NOK/kg)	40	Calibrated
1SW in the sea (NOK/kg)	60	Calibrated

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602 **Table 2.** Harvest ('000kg) from sea and river fishing under different fishing mortalities over
 603 40 years. Highlights show the maximum harvest value.
 604

Fishing mortality	0.25	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.9
<i>Scenario I - without escapees</i>							
<i>Sea fishing</i>	2.86	4.78	5.61	7.14	8.17	8.84	8.49
<i>River fishing</i>	2.87	4.05	4.92	5.40	5.72	5.49	4.40
Total benefit	5.73	8.84	10.53	12.54	13.89	14.33	12.89
<i>Scenario II – with escapees (20%)</i>							
<i>Sea fishing</i>	2.73	4.53	5.52	6.85	7.92	8.53	8.20
<i>River fishing</i>	2.67	3.74	4.37	4.90	5.10	5.01	4.15
Total benefit	5.40	8.27	9.89	11.85	13.02	13.54	12.35
<i>Scenario III – with escapees(50)</i>							
<i>Sea fishing</i>	2.74	4.50	5.54	7.03	8.40	9.79	11.58
<i>River fishing</i>	2.48	3.56	4.06	4.42	4.41	4.18	3.50
Total benefit	5.22	8.06	9.60	11.45	12.81	14.97	15.08

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630 **Table 3.** Economic benefits ('000 NOK) from sea and river fishing under different fishing
 631 mortalities over 40 years. Highlights show the maximum economic benefits.

632

Fishing mortality	0.25	0.40	0.50	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90
<i>Scenario I - without escapees</i>							
<i>Sea fishing</i>	174	287	334	426	487	527	507
<i>River fishing</i>	1390	1961	2380	2615	2770	2656	2129
Total benefit	1564	2248	2714	3041	3257	3183	2636
<i>Scenario II – with escapees (20%)</i>							
<i>Sea fishing</i>	170	276	337	418	483	520	499
<i>River fishing</i>	714	1007	1183	1344	1421	1421	1227
Total benefit	884	1283	1520	1762	1904	1941	1726
<i>Scenario III – with escapees(50)</i>							
<i>Sea fishing</i>	171	280	346	445	541	639	773
<i>River fishing</i>	551	734	807	834	815	770	655
Total benefit	722	1010	1153	1279	1356	1409	1428

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643 **Table 4.** Social welfare from harvesting and wild salmon stock with different α values and
 644 fishing mortalities under three scenarios over 40 years ($\alpha = 0$ only stock value; $\alpha = 1$ only
 645 harvest value). Highlights show the maximum value given a weight of α .

646

Fishing mortality \ Weight α	0.0 0.5 1.0			0.0 0.5 1.0			0.0 0.5 1.0		
	<i>Scenario I (no escapees)</i>			<i>Scenario II (20%)</i>			<i>Scenario III (50)</i>		
0.00	112.52	56.26	0.00	99.95	49.98	0.00	97.58	48.79	0.00
0.25	107.45	96.85	86.24	94.91	90.05	85.19	86.62	85.56	84.50
0.4	103.70	98.73	93.76	91.12	91.85	92.59	76.85	84.48	92.11
0.5	100.86	98.83	96.79	88.40	92.04	95.68	68.22	81.67	95.12
0.6	96.41	98.12	99.83	83.96	91.32	98.68	53.72	75.49	98.16
0.7	91.04	96.31	101.58	78.66	89.54	100.42	40.72	70.41	100.10
0.8	84.37	93.21	102.05	71.96	86.49	100.01	31.04	66.30	101.56
0.9	71.84	85.86	99.88	59.50	79.27	99.03	21.09	61.99	102.89

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658 **Figure 1.** Schematic representation of the Atlantic salmon life cycle, with the addition of
659 escaped farmed salmon into the spawning population. The illustrated stages are fertilized eggs
660 E ; fry (0^+) recruitment R ; the number of smolts N_s ; adult marine stages including 1 sea-winter
661 N_{1sw} and 2 sea-winter N_{2sw} salmon; early farmed escapees, Y_1 ; and late farmed escapees, Y_2 .
662 Fishing takes place during the migration towards their native spawning grounds. $s_{(a)}$ is an age-
663 specific survival rate; θ is the fraction of mature male parr participating in the spawning; μ
664 is the fraction of 1 sea-winter salmon maturing and returning towards the river; and f_1 and f_2
665 are the fishing mortality rates for 1 and 2 sea-winter salmon respectively.

666

667 **Figure 2.** Spawning populations of wild salmon in weight (a) and total harvest in weight (b)
668 for Scenario I without escapees. The simulations are run under different fishing mortalities.

669 **Figure 3.** Spawning stocks of wild (W) and farmed (F, including feral and hybrid) salmon for
670 Scenario II, with 20% escapees entering the spawning population each year. The simulations
671 are run with different fishing mortalities.

672 **Figure 4.** Total harvest (in kg) for Scenario II, with 20% escapees entering the spawning
673 population each year. The simulations are run with different fishing mortalities.

674 **Figure 5.** Economic benefits of sea fishing (a) and river fishing (b) for Scenario II, with 20%
675 escapees entering the spawning population each year. The simulations are run with different
676 fishing mortalities.

677 **Figure 6.** Spawning stocks of wild (W) and farmed (F) salmon for Scenario III with a fixed
678 number of escapees (50) entering the spawning population each year. The simulations are run
679 with different fishing mortalities.

680 **Figure 7.** Total harvest for Scenario III with a fixed number of escapees (50) in weight under
681 different fishing mortalities

682 **Figure 8.** Economic benefits of sea fishing (a) and river fishing (b) for Scenario III with a
683 fixed escapees (50) under different fishing mortalities.

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




Figure 1.



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711 **Figure 2.**


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718 **Figure 3.**

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
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732 **Figure 4.**

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
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
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
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749 **Figure 5.**

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752 **Figure 6.**

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
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769 **Figure 7.**

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
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
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786 **Figure 8.**