

# A threshold public good game with public good and public bad framing – Evidence from farmers and fishers in Cambodia

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In Cambodia, fishery governance relies largely on informal agreements of community groups, organized per village. The agreements are non-binding but stimulate social norms of cooperation. At the same time, enforcement of these agreements is weak or completely absent. Also, the access to water and fish is an institutional right in Cambodia, which increases the difficulties in resource management. Thus, farmers and fishers rely on the management of the resources through social norms to avoid a collapse of the resource (e.g. the fish stock collapse) or to ensure access to a resource (maintaining irrigation infrastructure).

We conduct lab-in-the-field experiments in 21 villages in Cambodia. We perform a threshold public good games to understand how the cooperation evolves when a threshold has to be reached before cooperation pays off. In particular, we are interested whether we can see framing effects when presenting the game as a public good or a public bad game.

We find that the level of cooperation is higher in a public good than a public bad framing. This results in a higher success rate of achieving the public good than avoiding the public bad. The effect is partially driven by the differing beliefs about the partners' contributions. In the public bad framing we see that people place high hopes on the contributions of the other group members while in the public good framing the contributions about other group members contributions are anticipated to be insufficient to reach the threshold.

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